Two stylized facts characterized Japan during the so-called Lost Decade (1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005): rising wage inequalities and increasing productivity di¤er-entials at the …rm level. Surprisingly, these features have never been connected in the literature. This paper attempts to …ll this gap by proposing an explanation focusing on labor market mechanisms. We …rst construct an e¢ ciency wage model with two types of …rms distinguished by their job security schemes and associated incentive mechanisms. We show that a comparable negative productivity shock at the aggregate level leads to di¤erent …rm reactions; namely, the model predicts increasing e¤ort from workers in …rms employing an e¢ ciency wage mechanism. This leads to increasing productivity and wage di¤erentials and a rise of the share of these …rms in the total population of …rms. We test this model using Japanese micro data. For the …rst time, we match the Basic Survey on Wage Structure and the Employment Trend Survey for 2005. The matched worker-…rm dataset we obtain allows us to con…rm the existence of an e¢ ciency wage mechanism on average. We also divide our sample of …rms into two groups using the unknown regime switching regression à la Dickens and Lang (1985) , and …nd that the primary sector, unlike the secondary, is characterized by e¢ ciency wages. We con…rm this result with various robustness checks. Finally, we simulate the evolution of the share of the primary sector in the economy and …nd that it substantially increased between 1981 and 2005 in line with the predictions of our model. JEL Classi…cation: L23, J24, J31, J42
Introduction
For several decades, wage inequality has substantially increased in the US, the UK and many other OECD countries. Japan is no exception. However, until recently, there was no consensus on whether income inequality widened during the 1990s and afterward (OECD, 2006) . For example, Tachibanaki (2005) claimed that income inequality increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Conversely, Ohtake (2005) found that the increase in income inequality was partly due to the aging population. By focusing on the wage rate, Kambayashi et al. (2008) attempted to reconcile these two views. Employing the DiNardo et al. (1996) decomposition technique, they concluded the following: "although simple aggregate statistics may give the impression that wage inequality did not change during the period, the decomposition analysis reveals that the seemingly steady trend is a product of two opposing trends: 1) declining between-group (de…ned by education, experience, tenure and …rm/establishment size) wage inequality; and 2) increasing within-group inequality among male workers."
The central purpose of Kambayashi et al. (2008) was to assess the reality of increasing wage inequality. Moreover, in employing DiNardo et al. 's (1996) methodology to decompose the change in the wage distribution into the relative contributions of changes in the skill distribution of workers and factor prices, their results can be mobilized to add a further piece of evidence to the ongoing debate between the proponents of skill-biased technical change and "revisionists" (Card & DiNardo, 2002) . However, there is another possible interpretation. In the UK, Faggio et al. (2007) found that rising wage inequalities primarily concern workers with equivalent observable characteristics. To explain these rising within-group inequalities, Faggio et al. (2007) analyzed its counterpart of increasing productivity dispersion across …rms between and within sectors, and showed a link between the two phenomena.
Other researchers, including Mortensen (2003) , have also conducted this type of analysis. Although some studies (e.g., Kambayashi et al., 2008, and Tachibanaki, 2005) consider the wage di¤erential between …rms of di¤erent sizes in Japan, there has been no recent investigation of between-…rm wage dispersion in connection with productivity di¤erentials. This is even more surprising as recent work has established yet another stylized fact: namely, increasing heterogeneity of the performance of …rms belonging to the same sectors and categories of size (Fukao & Kwon, 2006; Ito & Lechevalier, 2009) . One reason for the absence of this type of study is that a dominant concern has been the within-…rm wage di¤erential between regular and nonregular workers: the rising share of nonregular workers, which has more than doubled in 20 years to almost one-third of the workforce, has been a popular explanation for the rising wage inequalities in Japan (Ota, 2005) . Another possible reason for the neglected study of the link between increasing productivity dispersion and rising wage inequality is that studies that have taken into account the …rm size di¤erential have found that it does not explain the increasing wage gap (e.g., Kambayashi et al., 2008) .
Of course, the focus on wage di¤erentials among …rms of di¤erent sizes is understandable in a country that was (and still is to a certain extent) characterized by a dual structure according to the size of the …rm. However, the fact that the separation by …rm size is not a key determinant of the increasing wage di¤er-ential should not lead to the conclusion that the between-…rm wage di¤erential is not important: as in the US, Japan is characterized by a decentralized wage system (though with some important di¤erences) that make crucial the analysis of the inter…rm wage di¤erential. If one aims at connecting the evolution of productivity and wage di¤erentials, one has to take into account the fact that the increasing productivity di¤erentials since the mid-1990s mainly occurred in …rms of similar size belonging to the same narrowly de…ned sectors.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a theoretical framework that focuses on labor market mechanisms without referring to other factors such as the impact of technical progress and internationalization. Second, we test our theoretical model using a rich employer-employee dataset. More speci…cally, in a …rst step we construct an e¢ ciency wage model with just one sector but two types of …rms of similar size. The di¤erence between the two types of …rms is interpreted in terms of productive models, such as in Oï (1983) , rather than in terms of monitoring technology, as in Bulow and Summers (1986) . More precisely, in one type of …rm, productivity is assumed to be endogenous and determined by workers' production e¤ort, while in the other type of …rm, productivity is exogenous. In solving the model, we determine employment in the primary sector (that is, in terms of the number of …rms), the rate of hiring and separation, worker e¤ort and the wage. We …nd that a productivity slowdown at the aggregate level leads interdependently to rising productivity and wage di¤erentials and an increasing share of primary …rms.
In a second step, we test this model using micro data. For the …rst time, we merge two databases, the Basic Survey on Wage Structure and the Employment Trend Survey for 2005. This allows us to obtain information on (hourly) wages and accession and separation rates. We also control for the characteristics of …rms (size and sector) and workers (age, gender and education). The results are as follows. First, we con…rm the existence of e¢ ciency wages on average. Second, we divide our sample of …rms into two groups using the unknown regime switching regression à la Dickens and Lang (1985) , and …nd that the primary sector, unlike the secondary, is characterized by e¢ ciency wages. Finally, we run a simulation for the period 1981-2005 and …nd that the share of the primary sector in the economy substantially increased in line with the predictions of our model.
The model
We consider a simple dual labor market model. 1 This dualism corresponds to two alternative labor organization structures. Firms active in the primary labor market must implement a more productive (but more costly) organizational structure. Other …rms (active on the secondary labor market) implement a less costly and less productive organizational structure, and hire workers in the secondary labor market. We assume that one …rm equals one job. Hence, the levels of employment in the primary/secondary markets stem from the distribution of …rms across the two productive models.
The model's timeline is as follows: t = 0, …rms are matched with a given productive model, and employment in the primary and secondary markets is derived; t = 1, wages and tenure are determined for primary and secondary jobs; t = 2, workers'e¤ort in primary jobs is determined.
Primary jobs require the incentivization of workers' e¤orts. An incentive mechanism is at play yielding real wage growth in line with e¤ort. Secondary jobs are perfectly competitive. No incentive is required, so the workers'utility is equal to that of unemployed workers. Unemployment bene…ts depend on taxes raised on wages. To ensure progressive taxation, only primary market workers are taxed:
with U = N L 1 L 2 , N being the total labor force. The tax rate t is exogenous.
Incentives and e¤ort
We solve the model through backward induction starting at Stage 2.
2 We consider two types of …rms: type1 …rms are active in the primary market, while type2 …rms hire workers only in the secondary market. The endogenous number of …rms is determined in Stage 0 (see Section 2.3 below).
Here, we provide the dynamic equations for the utilities of shirker (V S 1 ) and nonshirker workers (V N S 1 ) employed in primary market jobs, along with the utilities of the unemployed (V U ) and workers employed in secondary market jobs (V 2 ):
We assume that there is no hiring and …ring in the secondary labor market. From the no-shirking condition (V
we obtain the standard incentivecompatible real wage schedule (e¢ ciency wage) applying to workers in primary jobs:
Given this condition, type1 …rms endogenously generate an e¤ort function by maximizing the job's value. The values of jobs in the primary and secondary markets (respectively J 1 and J 2 ) are given by the following equations:
with:
Hence, the productivity of primary market jobs is endogenous and determined by workers' productive e¤ort. All other things being equal, the more intense the e¤ort, the higher is productivity. However, there is a drawback to more intense e¤ort as it also yields higher disutility for workers; that is, the utility cost of e¤ort increases. This is a crucial aspect of the model. Unlike standard Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984)-type models, we consider that e¤ort is endogenous. Therefore, …rms have an interest in trying to improve e¤ort. In fact, given equation (9), we can see that increasing e¤ort allows …rms to increase their productivity. Nevertheless, it is clear from equation (2) that increasing e¤ort yields a higher utility cost for workers. However, workers are paid for their increased e¤ort because real wages are set according to an incentive-compatible e¢ ciency wage mechanism. Hence, subject to the e¢ ciency wage constraint, workers are indeed willing to increase their e¤ort. In terms of …rms, equation (6) clearly shows that …rms are obliged to pay higher wages when e¤ort increases to prevent shirking. Pro…t maximization yields an endogenous e¤ort function:
Wages and tenure
We now turn to Stage 1 of the model. As in standard labor market models, …rms compete to attract workers. In our framework, …rms can compete on both wages and working conditions. In particular, type1 …rms can o¤er various degrees of job tenure (measured by s 1 ). Better job security increases workers' utility and e¤ort, and lowers the incentive wage. Hence, there is a trade-o¤ for …rms between higher wages or better tenure for workers.
Because of (perfect) competition across …rms, wages and tenure are set to ensure that job values are driven down to zero:
This implies that w 2 is simply set equal to exogenous productivity m 2 . Regarding condition (11) , one should recall that m 1 is determined according to equation (9) . Substituting (9) in condition (11) yields the following zero-pro…t wage schedule:
In our model (as in other standard dual labor market models) secondary market jobs provide no extra rents for workers. Hence, for workers employed in type2 …rms, utility is set equal to V U :
Substituting equations (4) and (5) for V U and V 2 in condition (14), we obtain an additional relation between w 1 and w 2 . We call this a "no-migration" condition as it prevents ‡ows from (to) the secondary market to (from) unemployment:
with w u determined according to equation (1) . Finally, we need to ensure that ‡ows on the labor market are at equilibrium. Hence, a ‡ow equilibrium condition is considered, ensuring that hiring always matches …ring:
Recall that U = N L 1 L 2 , and that employment is determined by the number of …rms in the primary/secondary market.
At the equilibrium, the e¢ ciency wage and the zero-pro…t wage schedules should intersect. By substituting equations (10), (1) and (16) for e, w u and a 1 6 in equation (6) , and then equating (11) and (6), we determine the separation rate as a function of hiring conditions:
We now turn to the no-migration condition. At the equilibrium, workers should be indi¤erent between secondary jobs and unemployment. We substitute equations (10), (1) and (16) for e, w u and a 1 in equation (15) , and then impose (12) . This allows us to determine the equilibrium hiring rate:
We now solve the model recursively. From (17) , one easily obtains the equilibrium separation rate:
From equation (10), we have:
Finally, equation (13) yields:
Productive model and employment
In Stage 0, …rms are distributed across the existing productive models. We simply assume that adopting a type1 productive model is costly. This cost depends on the speci…city of this productive model. Moreover, the cost is likely to be higher under poor macroeconomic conditions. Let us take the simple situation where the cost of adopting a type1 productive model is equal to:
Hence, if …rms want to adopt the more productive organizational model, they will only become indi¤erent between the type1 and type2 models when the following condition is satis…ed:
From (16) and (19) we know that U = s1 L1 a1 = 2 t L1 1+t : The above condition thus yields:
This allows us to determine the number of …rms adopting the type1 productive model. It is important to note that this value is a linear combination of the productivity di¤erential between type1 …rms and type2 …rms (or equivalently, the wage di¤erential between the two types of …rms). Given the assumption of a "one worker-one …rm"match, the number of type1 …rms equals the employment level in the primary market (L 1 ). We can then easily derive unemployment as U = 2 t L 1 1+t :
Consequences of a lower A
We now analyze the consequences of exogenous changes in given parameters of the model on the equilibrium values of the relevant endogenous variables. We are particularly interested in assessing the consequences of an economic crisis. As the Japanese economy during the Lost Decade (1992-2005) was characterized by a slowdown in productivity growth at the aggregate level (Yoshikawa, 2008), the relevant parameter in our model is therefore A, the exogenous productivity component of primary market jobs. We can regard crisis in our model as yielding a one-o¤ fall in A. In this section, we assess the consequences of this fall on macroeconomic equilibrium in the model.
We can show that:
A fall in A yields a lower s 1 . Hence, one consequence of the crisis is higher tenure for employed workers and greater job security.
From equations (20) and (21), we can see that increased tenure (i.e., lower s 1 ) yields higher e¤ort and wages for primary market workers. As a direct consequence, the share of primary …rms in the economy increases; this result will be used in the empirical section. We can show that these results hold despite the direct o¤setting e¤ect of the lower A:
One should note that the overall productivity of …rms o¤ering primary market jobs increases following the crisis. This is entirely because of the increase in productive e¤ort, i.e., to the endogenous intensi…cation of work in primary jobs. As a consequence, productivity di¤erentials across …rms proposing primary as against secondary market jobs increase because of the crisis. To summarize, let us assume that the crisis brings about a fall in the exogenous component of productivity (because of a reduction in technological capabilities and/or other demand-driven factors). As a consequence, …rms seek the intensi…cation of productive e¤ort to compensate for the fall in productivity. However, work intensi…cation yields higher utility costs for workers. Hence, …rms need to compensate to avoid shirking. To ensure higher e¤ort, …rms act on two distinct grounds. First, real wages w 1 associated with primary market jobs increase to o¤set the growing utility cost of e¤ort. This is a standard result. However, in our model, job security is also endogenous. Hence, …rms can provide higher job security to primary market workers so they favor an increase in e¤ort, as indicated in equation (20) . This is what happens at the equilibrium: primary market workers receive better job security and higher wages as a consequence of the exogenous productivity fall.
Moreover, because of the increased m 1 , the productivity di¤erential across the two types of …rms increases. This encourages …rms to adopt a type1 productive model up to the point where condition (23) is again satis…ed. According to (24) , this yields a higher proportion of type1 …rms, as well as higher unemployment, at the equilibrium.
One should note that all of the above results can be derived under more general assumptions concerning the productivity of type2 …rms. In particular, we can assume that m 2 also depends on A. Hence, a lower A yields a fall in the productivity of type2 …rms. Our main results still hold under this assumption, but are more contingent on any speci…c parametric restrictions.
Comments
The result we obtain deserves some further comment, especially before turning to the empirical part of the paper. The …rst remark concerns the nature of the di¤erences between the two types of …rms. In our model, these di¤erences are interpreted in terms of productive models, as in Oï (1983), rather than in terms of the monitoring technology used in di¤erent sectors, as in Bulow and Summers (1986) . More precisely, in one type of …rm, the productivity is assumed to be endogenous and determined by workers' production e¤ort, while in the other type of …rm, it is exogenous. The main novelty of our model in comparison to previous formalization is that the type1 …rms endogenously generate an e¤ort function. Put di¤erently, in this case the adjustment is made through e¤ort. The di¤erence between these two types of …rms does not concern the ability of some to restructure or downsize while the others are more rigid. The key mechanism we emphasize is job security and the associated incentive scheme (e¢ ciency wages): …rms may either decide to adopt this organization or prefer a competitive scheme. 4 A second remark concerns the causes of the evolution of the wage and productivity di¤erentials. Layard et al. (2005) show how the link between workers' wages and employer productivity can be modeled in a variety of ways (union bargaining, e¢ ciency wages, rent-sharing and search-based). Whether e¢ ciency wages apply in Japan is a matter of empirical investigation and we provide a new test. However, the most important element in the choice of our model is that it represents a noncompetitive environment and that the di¤erence in productive organization provides the reason for the productivity di¤erential. After having characterized the two types of productive models, we interpret the increasing wage and productivity di¤erentials as the result of the di¤erentiated reactions of the two types of …rms to a similar shock at the aggregate level. The question of the nature of this shock is completely open. Most important is that we are able to study the evolution of the di¤erential without introducing any assumptions regarding technical progress or internationalization. The origin of the growing wage di¤erential then lies in the initial di¤erences in the productive models and in their di¤erentiated response to the productive shock. This means that we focus on labor market mechanisms, without referring to any technological account, as in, say, Faggio et al. A third and …nal remark is related to our dynamic result regarding the increase in the share of the primary sector (Subsection 2.4). This prediction of our model could be considered as not only counterintuitive but also in contradiction with a basic stylized fact characterizing the Japanese labor market for more than two decades, namely, the increasing share of nonregular workers. However, our de…nition of the primary/secondary sectors is based not on considerations regarding the employment status of workers, but rather on the "productive model" adopted by …rms. The validity of this prediction is con…rmed in the empirical section (Subsection 3.5). 4 Our interpretative framework is also distinguished from other explanations focusing on labor market mechanisms, including the role of labor unions (Freeman & Medo¤, 1983) , the role of size and/or human capital (Haltiwanger et al., 1999) , and the di¤erences in the capital/labor ratio (Leonardi, 2007) , for example. 5 Both papers provide a test of Caselli's (1999) model, where the increasing dispersion of productivity (and thus, average wages among …rms) can be explained by the di¤erentiated rate of introduction of new technologies.
3 An empirical test using Japanese micro data
Empirical strategy
According to the model presented in the previous section, we should …nd a negative relationship between ‡ow behavior and wage levels in the primary sector (as in equation (21)), whereas there should be no correlation between these in the secondary sector. The goal of this empirical section is to explain actual di¤erentials in productivity and wages by applying the above dichotomy to the Japanese economy.
Ideally, testing our model would require a micro panel dataset that includes data on wages and accession and separation rates. Moreover, the sample period should correspond more or less to the so-called Lost Decade (1992-2005) when the Japanese economy was characterized by a long stagnation and increasing wage and productivity di¤erentials. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge, such a database does not publicly exist in Japan. However, we can obtain access to the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) and the Employment Trend Survey (ETS) for 2005. From the BSWS we obtain information on wages and from the ETS we acquire accession and separation rate data. Then, using an identi…cation key provided by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), we are able to match these two datasets at the establishment level. In so doing, we construct a matched employer-employee dataset. The use of this kind of database to study the type of question we are interested is well known (Abowd et al., 1999).
Using these one-time cross-sectional data, we …rst detect the existence of an e¢ ciency wage mechanism through the criterion described above: the existence of a negative correlation between the ‡ow structure and wage. To do this, we estimate a Mincerian equation for male regular workers where the dependent variable is the logarithm of scheduled hourly wage rates and the explanatory variables are worker characteristics, including sex, education, tenure and prefecture dummies (Kambayashi et al., 2008) . The mean of the residual of this equation for each establishment can be interpreted as establishment-speci…c components. In this model, when an establishment belongs to the primary sector, the mean residual of the establishment should be negatively correlated with the magnitude of the out ‡ow.
In the following step, we use the unknown regime switching technique (Dickens & Lang, 1985; Ishikawa & Dejima, 1994) to decompose the economy into two types of establishments. This is because we do not have any explicit ex ante criteria to de…ne to what sector an establishment belongs. We then check for a similar relation between the mean residual and the ‡ow structure in both sectors. Finally, we are able to simulate the evolution of productivity and wage di¤erentials induced by our model by extending the decomposition for the two sectors to the Lost Decade. 
The dataset
In this part, we match the BSWS and the ETS for 2005. As the BSWS is an individual survey and the ETS an establishment survey, we thereby obtain a matched worker-establishment database. The key issue is the size of the sample after matching.
The BSWS individual survey and the ETS establishment survey
The BSWS individual survey is conducted by the MHLW each year at the end of June. It covers private establishments with more than …ve employees and public establishments with more than 10 employees. All industries (except agriculture) are surveyed. Workers are resampled within an establishment. Each year, the sample includes about 78,000 establishments and 1.6 million workers. While the BSWS provides a rich set of information on establishment and individual characteristics, the most important attribute for us is the data on wages.
As for the ETS, this is an establishment survey also conducted by the MHLW, twice a year at the end of June and December. The ETS covers public and private establishments with more than …ve employees in all industries (except agriculture). Newly separated and newly hired workers (within the sampling period) are resampled within an establishment. The sample size each year is about 10,000 establishments, 80,000 in ‡ow workers and 90,000 out ‡ow workers. These data provide information on the numbers of new entrants and separations.
Matching the two surveys
With the BSWS, the data are collected at the end of June 2005 and the sample is restricted to regular full-time employees. As for the ETS, in ‡ow/out ‡ow refers to the numbers of acquisition/leaves for regular full-time workers between July and December 2005 (six months after the BSWS data point). The ratio is based on the stock of regular full-time employees at the beginning of July 2005.
We match these two surveys using a key provided by the MHLW. Although the size of the matched sample is 2,733, we found some possible inconsistencies in the data. The data point of the BSWS is the end of June 2005 and that of the ETS is the beginning of July 2005 (the day following the BSWS data point). We proceed to a sample restriction as follows: four establishments are excluded because of a negative employment stock at the beginning of July; 250 establishments are excluded because of an inconsistency in industry classi…cation between the BSWS and the ETS; and 435 establishments are excluded because of an inconsistency in …rm sizes and establishment size classi…cations between the BSWS and the ETS. As a result, the …nal size of the matched sample is 2,044 establishments. For the BSWS, the matching rate is only 5%, but it is 30% for the ETS; this is quite acceptable. Finally, note that this restriction is relatively conservative in that there is a possibility for an establishment and/or …rm to move to another classi…cation at the beginning of July.
Detecting the existence of e¢ ciency wage schemes
Whether an e¢ ciency wage is a satisfactory model for the Japanese labor market is a matter of empirical investigation. However, depending on the exact nature of the e¢ ciency wage model, the empirical strategy may drastically vary. Moreover, the results may be ambiguous, as it is sometimes di¢ cult to empirically distinguish between the predictions of di¤erent models (Manning, 2003) . For example, Abe and Ohashi (2004) con…rm the existence of an e¢ ciency wage model in Japan by analyzing wage pro…les. In our case, in order to detect the existence of an e¢ ciency wage on average, we proceed as follows.
First, according to a conventional procedure in the usage of the BSWS, we calculate the scheduled hourly wage as the monthly salary (excluding various allowances) per scheduled working hour (w i;2005 ). Second, we limit the sample to regularly employed males in private …rms with more than 30 employees (except for the construction industry) to retain comparability with the public data. Third, we regress the log of the scheduled hourly wage on dummy variables for educational level, age, age squared divided by 100, tenure, tenure squared divided by 100, and prefecture dummies ( 
Here u i;2005 is, given X i;2005 , a normally distributed unobservable term with mean zero. By using the estimated coe¢ cients in equation (25), we can produce the residual for each individual. If human capital markets are perfect, the residual of (25) can be interpreted as the unobserved matching rent (or establishment-individual speci…c component) a certain worker can enjoy just because he belongs to a speci…c establishment. Summary statistics of the residuals are reported in Table 1 . We use the mean of the residual for each establishment to produce the establishment …xed e¤ect. The summary statistics of the mean residual for each establishment are reported in Table 2 .
The next step is to observe the nature of the wage premium from the viewpoint of ‡ow structure. According to equation (21) , the wage premium should be negatively correlated with the separation rate as well as the accession rate in the primary sector. The next …gure (Figure 1 ) is a scatterplot of the mean residual and ‡ow ratios at the establishment level. As shown, there appears to be a slight negative relationship, meaning that turnover decreases as the average residual increases, as implied by equation (21). We can con…rm these negative relationships using the following simple regression reported in Table 3 . After controlling for industry, …rm size and the overtime ratio, we …nd a slightly signi…cant negative correlation between the out ‡ow ratio and the mean of the residuals. Therefore, we obtain empirical evidence to support the predictions of (21).
Although we can con…rm the existence of an e¢ ciency wage mechanism on average, the negative correlation does not appear to be universal when we consider Figure 1 . This leads to further investigation to divide the matched sample into two categories for the primary and secondary sectors. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The remaining explanatory variables include the average overtime ratio, four …rm size dummies, nine industry dummies and a constant. Gross ‡ow ratio is the in ‡ow ratio plus the out ‡ow ratio. Excess ‡ow ratio is the gross ‡ow ratio minus the absolute value of the employment growth rate.
Identifying the two types of …rms: a switching regression approach
To empirically test our model, the ideal would be to simultaneously obtain the following results: 1) identi…cation of the two types of …rms; 2) detection of e¢ ciency wages for one type and a competitive wage setting for the other according to same criterion used in the former step (a negative correlation between the mean residual and the out ‡ows). To divide the sample of …rms into two tiers, criteria such as …rm size and industry can o¤er the key for identi…cation. However, in adopting such a priori classi…cation, the problem is not only one of misclassifying some …rms. More profoundly, this process obscures the possibility of within-group heterogeneity; for example, two …rms of a similar size or belonging to the same sector may choose di¤erent wage and productive systems. This is why we adopt the unknown regime switching regression à la Dickens and Lang (1985). 6 With this methodology, the sample separation is a priori unknown and the segmental choice between the two sectors is explicitly endogenized (Sousa-Poza, 2004). The system of estimation is as follows: 6 A well-known limit of this methodology, already applied to the Japanese labor market by Ishikawa and Dejima (1994), is that it provides a test for dual labor markets and does not recognize the prospect of three market segments. However, from the point of view of the question we address in this paper, this is not a problem as we explicitly focus on the separation between two types of productive models. 
where : R j;k is the mean residual of establishment j in sector k (p: primary, s: secondary);
Y j is the separation ratio of establishment j; Z j are control variables; z is a latent variable that splits the sample into two kinds of sectors; j provides the key to identifying the division of the sectors. Because R j;k is the mean residual and can be interpreted as a quasi-rent, industry and …rm size should matter. Therefore, we include nine industry dummies and four …rm size dummies as controls. R j;k may also be a¤ected by unobserved temporary demand shocks, causing omitted variable bias. To cope with the potential bias, we …rst limit the hourly wage to the scheduled wage as this is unlikely to be a¤ected by temporary demand shocks. We then introduce the average overtime ratio within the establishment to directly control for any temporary demand shock. Our next issue before estimating the system of equations (26) is to de…ne the key to identify the two sectors, V j . Our strategy is to use the di¤erence in gross job ‡ow between males and females as the identi…er. 7 This refers to a stylized fact characterizing the Japanese labor market, namely, discrimination against female workers (Wakisaka, 1997). For example, it is well documented that the average wage of female workers is almost 30% lower than the average male wage, even after controlling for human capital characteristics. Several economists have also run the so-called "market test"for female discrimination and found further supporting empirical evidence of discrimination. More profoundly, it has been shown that the wage di¤erential between Japanese male and female workers fundamentally arises from di¤erences in job stability; in particular, the number of female workers tends to be adjusted as a bu¤er for temporary shocks. This is con…rmed with our dataset: in calculating the turnover rate by gender, we …nd an apparent di¤erence in the gross ‡ow rates between male and female regular workers (table 4) . More precisely, the gross ‡ow rate is higher and more volatile for female regular workers than for males. As a result, these turnover rates are not very strongly correlated. 8 Therefore, this is quite consistent if we assume on the basis of conventional wisdom that female workers are usually treated as more ‡exible inputs in many Japanese …rms.
Our basic hypothesis to di¤erentiate between the primary group of …rms (those characterized by an e¢ ciency wage mechanism) and a secondary group of …rms (where competitive mechanisms apply) is as follows.
At …rst, we assume female workers never join the primary sector; therefore, the exogenous demand shock directly a¤ects the ‡ow ratio of female workers. 9 If the turnover rate of male employees is no more than that of female workers within the same …rm, the male workers in this establishment are more or less likely to be shielded from the exogenous demand shock. We interpret that these male workers likely belong to the primary sector. Therefore, if the turnover rate of male regular workers is lower than that of females, the male workers in such establishments may belong to the e¢ ciency wage sector. On the other hand, if the turnover rate of male regular workers is higher than or equal to that of females, they may belong to the competitive sector. After having chosen this identi…er, we run the estimation based on equation (26) .
The estimated results are shown in Table 5 . (3b) is the same as in Table 3 , in which we can …nd a weakly negative correlation on average between the separation rate and the mean residual. We focus here on the key relations between the mean of the residual and out ‡ow ratio reported in Table 5 . When we divide the sample into two parts according to the switching equation (5c), this negative relation is exhibited more strongly and signi…cantly in the primary sector (5b), whereas it is rather small and statistically insigni…cant in the secondary sector (5a). As a whole, these results imply that …rms in the primary sector resort to e¢ ciency wages, whereas …rms in the secondary sector do not.
The system of equations is consistently estimated not only based on our assumption but also in reference to the literature on the wage premium. First, the di¤erence between the male and female out ‡ow negatively a¤ects the establishments'probability of belonging to the primary sector as well as signi…cantly in the switching equation (5c). This implies that our identi…cation strategy works well. Moreover, the overtime ratio positively a¤ects the wage premium only in the secondary sector (5a) but insigni…cantly in the primary sector (5b). As the overtime ratio is an indicator of a temporary idiosyncratic demand shock, it is natural that wages increase during the boom period in the competitive market, whereas the wage setting mechanism in the primary sector is somewhat shielded from temporary ‡uctuations in demand. This …nding is in accordance with the coexistence of e¢ ciency wage and competitive markets. Third, as in the …rm size literature, we also …nd that workers in larger …rms enjoy a larger wage premium in both the primary and the secondary sectors ((5a) and (5b)). Fourth, the switching equation implies that smaller …rms are less likely to belong to the primary sector (compared with the largest …rms), and that …rms in the services industry are more likely to be in the primary sector (compared with those in the manufacturing industry). As equation (5c) is a type of probit model, we cannot directly distinguish the magnitude of the marginal e¤ect of the variables. Instead, we decompose the sample by the ex post estimated probability to be in the primary sector and, by comparing the summary statistics in Table 6 , can con…rm the di¤erence in …rm characteristics between the more-likely-primary-sector-…rms and the less-likely-primary-sector-…rms. As expected, the average quasi-rent is larger in the more-likely-primarysector-…rms. The di¤erence in gross ‡ows between male and female workers is much smaller in the more-likely-primary-sector-…rms. It is also apparent there are fewer smaller …rms among the more-likely-primary-sector-…rms. For example, among the …rms whose probability of belonging to the primary sector is more than 0.1, smaller …rms (those with fewer than 299 employees) account for 24.4% whereas they account for up to 36.4% in less-likely …rms. In other words, …rms in manufacturing industries have a lower probability of being a more-likely-primary-sector-…rm whereas …rms in the services industry have a higher probability of being a more-likely-primary-sector-…rm.
Overall, the estimation of the system of equations does not explicitly contradict the existence of e¢ ciency wages in the primary sector and competitive wages in the secondary sector. In this sense, our analysis provides an ex post justi…cation for the use of the unknown switching regression methodology à la Dickens and Lang.
Robustness of switching regression
The existence of an e¢ ciency wage is thus far not contradicted by our estimation. However, it is necessary to conduct some robustness checks to make this conclusion stronger. In particular, our results may have been a¤ected by a demand shock or a change in worker composition. On-the-job search may also be a mechanism underlying the negative relation we found between wages and ‡ows through a sorting e¤ect. In this section, we attempt to control for the …rst two e¤ects and test for an on-the-job search mechanism.
Controlling for a demand shock
Our theoretical model assumes a steady state. Therefore, transition when the establishment su¤ers from a temporal demand shock is out of the scope of our analysis. However, in reality, a temporal demand shock is unobservable and may a¤ect both the residual of the wage equation and turnover behavior. In this context, the estimated coe¢ cients may lose consistency if the error terms in (26) include unobservable temporal demand shocks. There are several strategies to remove the e¤ects of the unobservable demand shocks from the error terms. In the previous subsection, we conducted two types of treatment (Table 5) . First, we de…ne the wage premium as the residual of the scheduled hourly wage. Generally speaking, scheduled hourly wages are not directly a¤ected by temporal demand shocks as Japanese legal regulations require almost all employers to prepare a "Workplace Rule"(Shugyo Kisoku) to regulate ex ante the basic wage and labor hour scheme. In the survey, respondents are instructed to base the scheduled wages and hours reported on the wage and labor hour scheme set out in the Workplace Rule. Therefore, the scheduled hourly wages in our data are not directly a¤ected by temporary shocks. In practice, ex post adjustments in wages and working hours are usually made using bonus payments and overtime.
Second, it is possible for employers and employees to perceive future trends in overtime and raise scheduled wages to (at least partially) compensate in advance. As the expected overtime may be re ‡ected in the medium-term situation of the company, it also a¤ects gross ‡ows via the labor demand functions. Because of this potential bias, limiting the scheduled hourly wage will not be su¢ cient. To cope with this problem, we include the average ratio of actual overtime per worker as a control. If one assumes that the trend in labor demand is anticipated by the overtime ratio, we can consider that this control variable absorbs the compensated portion of the unobservable trend in demand shocks from the residuals of the scheduled wage equation.
These two treatments should reduce any spurious negative relationship relating to our dataset or measurement strategy. However, some unobservable correlation between demand shocks and gross out ‡ow may remain because of an insu¢ cient control of demand shocks. To cope with more persistent demand shocks and to check the robustness of our result, we select two types of proxy: the gross in ‡ow rate and the net employment growth of male regular workers. The switching regression system (26) is a simultaneous estimate. When we include a di¤erent set of explanatory variables, the whole system (including the switching equation) is estimated di¤erently. This implies that the probability weight for each observation, which is used in estimating wage premium equations, is also estimated di¤erently when we add variables. To distinguish between the e¤ects of adding control variables and changing the probability weights, we reserve the probability weight of each observation used in estimating (5a) and (5b) ( Table  5) , and reestimate only the wage premium equations with the extra controls for each sector. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The other explanatory variables include four …rm size dummies, nine industry dummies and a constant. The probability weight for each sector is the same as in (5a) and (5b).
The estimated results are shown in Table 7 . From (7a) to (7d), the extra variables to control for more persistent demand shocks do not alter the results.
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The gross out ‡ow is still negatively correlated with the wage premium in the primary sector, whereas it is not in the competitive sector. Additional controls for demand shocks do not signi…cantly a¤ect the wage premium, although all of the estimated coe¢ cients are positive. This is consistent with the interpretation of a demand shock.
Compositional e¤ect
In the estimation shown in Table 5 , we assumed that the scheduled hourly wage is solely determined by observable human capital attributes. In this case, any change in workforce composition does not a¤ect the residual in the wage equations. However, increased gross out ‡ow may introduce a change in the composition of the company's workforce and this may a¤ect the average level of the scheduled hourly wage. For example, let us assume some establishments are characterized by a backloaded wage pro…le. Any increase in younger and more inexperienced workers within these companies will then temporarily produce a larger wage premium, even though this change in the composition of the workforce will not alter the aggregated wage premium throughout the workers' lifetimes. As our dataset draws on a one-time cross-sectional survey, the unobservable deviation from the cross-sectional mean in each establishment may arise from a temporal imbalance in worker composition. To correct this, we use the di¤erence in the average age of the worker stock and worker in ‡ow. If the di¤erence is su¢ ciently large-for example, if the in ‡ow workers are much younger than the incumbents-the employers can receive some temporary bene…t in hiring younger workers. In other words, given the backloaded wage pro…le, the unobservable wage premium will be larger in …rms with a younger workforce.
The results are shown in columns (7e) and (7f) of Table 8 . It appears that the additional variables controlling for any potential composite change do not alter the results. That is, the coe¢ cients for gross out ‡ow remain positive in the primary sector and almost zero in the secondary sector. The coe¢ cient of the composition e¤ect is positive and signi…cant in both sectors, showing that this e¤ect matters given long-term employment practices in Japan.
On-the-job search
The on-the-job search mechanism may also be an explanation for the observed negative relation between the wage premium and gross out ‡ow, as shown in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Workers in most productive establishments do not have any incentive to search for another job, because they receive enough match-speci…c bene…ts. Therefore, voluntary quits in these establishments will be lower. As a result, gross out ‡ow and productivity will be negatively correlated. To control for this potential bias, we use the ratio of voluntary quits as an additional control variable. It is almost the same to specify gross involuntary out ‡ows on the RHS. The results of the estimations are shown in (7g) and (7h) of Table 8 . As noted earlier, the inclusion of variables to control for on-the-job Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The other explanatory variable includes four …rm size dummies, nine industry dummies and a constant. The probability weight for each sector is the same as in (5a) and (5b).
search incentives does not a¤ect our results. The ratio of voluntary quits negatively a¤ects the wage premium. This implies that on-the-job search incentives exist in both sectors. However, apart from the on-the-job search incentives, gross out ‡ow still a¤ects the wage premium negatively and signi…cantly, but only in the primary sector. Overall, these results illustrate the robustness of our estimation.
Simulation
Ideally, the purpose of this section is to simulate the evolution of the productivity and wage di¤erentials on the basis of the relationships observed for 2005.
In so doing, we are able to check whether our model can replicate the stylized facts emphasized in the introduction. More precisely, from our model, we expect that a negative productivity shock at the aggregate level (similar to what was observed in Japan during the Lost Decade) should lead to increasing wage di¤erentials. However, because of a lack of data, we are not able to directly con…rm (or otherwise) the predictions of our model regarding the evolution of the wage and productivity di¤erentials. Instead, we focus on another relation, given by equation (24) , which describes the share of primary …rms as a linear combination of the productivity (respectively wage) di¤erential between the two sectors. As shown in Section 2.4, the increase in the productivity and wage di¤erentials from a negative productivity shock at the aggregate level goes hand in hand with an increase in the share of the primary sector. Moreover, we are able to calculate the respective impact of two mechanisms at the origin of the evolution of the primary sector: the e¢ ciency wage mechanism and the structural e¤ects regarding the industry and …rm size changes.
From the switching regression estimates at the establishment level (Table 5) , we deduce the probability that establishment j belongs to the primary sector as:
Here F is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, V j is the di¤erence in gross worker ‡ow between male and female workers, and Z j are dummies for industry and …rm size. For the 1,875 establishments in the sample, the mean of the imputed probability of belonging to the primary sector is 0.27.
To evaluate the share of the primary sector in the economy, it is necessary to summarize the probabilities with some weights. The number of male regular workers is an available and consistent weight. In this case, the weighted average of probabilities will be equivalent to the share of regular male workers under the e¢ ciency mechanism, that is, 0.21. For consistency throughout the analysis, we assume female regular workers are under a competitive mechanism. Then the share of primary sector workers is within about 0.16 of regular workers.
In the next step, our concern is to determine the evolution of the share of the primary sector. As the published ETS provides the aggregated worker ‡ows by gender, …rm size, and industry since 1981, we are able to put in perspective the evolution during the Lost Decade by taking into account the evolution in the 1980s. If we assume that the switching equation has been stable over time, we can impute the probability of the average …rm belonging to the primary sector in a certain industry, for a certain size class and for a certain year. By using the imputed probability, we can deduce the average share of the primary sector, under the assumption that female workers are always in the secondary sector. Let us de…ne S t as the share of primary sector, E t as the number of regular workers and M kt as the number of male regular workers of industry …rm size k in year t. V kt is the di¤erence in aggregated gross worker ‡ow between male and female workers, and Z kt are dummies for industry and …rm size classi…cation. S t should be de…ned as follows:
In Figure 2 we depict the transition in the imputed shares of the primary sector among regular workers between 1981 and 2005. 10 We show other com- 
The di¤erence in the two lines is produced by the e¤ect of the changes in the worker ‡ows.
In Figure 2 , we can see that the estimated share of the primary sector is 0.23 for all regular workers in 2005. Perhaps because of aggregation, this …gure is much higher than the micro-data-based mean probability of 0.16. Therefore, we should be cautious when interpreting the simulated probability using aggregated data.
Putting aside the level of shares, a more interesting feature in Figure 2 is the upward trend in the primary sector over the decades. We can distinguish two steps in the increase in this share, between 1981 and 1991 (an increase of 0.6) and between 1992 and 2005 (an increase of 1.9). It is then possible to say that this trend has accelerated from the early 1990s, even if it is characterized by ‡uctuations.
Moreover, a second conclusion is that this upward trend largely arises from the shift in industry and …rm size. As shown in the full estimates of the switching regression (Table 5) , male regular workers in larger …rms or in the services industry are more likely to be in the primary sector than those in smaller …rms or in manufacturing. Thus, the mean probability will change when the distribution of industries and …rm size shifts. It is well known that during the past few decades, structural changes in the Japanese economy have been characterized by a rising share of nonmanufacturing industries. This may be the underlying mechanism at the root of the increasing share of the primary sector in Japan, as depicted by Figure 2 . Furthermore, this trend would have been more rapid if the di¤erence in gross ‡ows between males and females had stayed at the 1981 level. In other words, the e¤ect of the change in out ‡ow-as a proxy for the strength of the e¢ ciency wage mechanism-has been somewhat negative. This means that, especially between 1990 and 1993 when the trends of the two lines apparently reversed, Japanese …rms have weakened the e¢ ciency wage mechanism by using male out ‡ow relatively more than female out ‡ow.
As a whole, the simulated evolution of the share of the primary sector con…rms the prediction of our model. However, the speci…c and relative impacts of the e¢ ciency wage mechanism in the rising share of the primary sector have declined since the 1990s.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a framework aiming at connecting two stylized facts that characterized the Japanese economy during the Lost Decade (1992-2005): rising wage inequality and increasing productivity di¤erentials. First, we built an e¢ ciency wage model with two types of …rms: in the primary sector, …rms adopt an e¢ ciency wage scheme, whereas the labor market in the secondary sector is competitive. A key feature of this model is that the …rst type of …rms endogenously generate an e¤ort function. In this model, a negative productivity shock at the aggregate level produces increasing productivity and wage di¤erentials, as well as a rising share of the primary sector.
Second, we tested this model using Japanese micro data. For the …rst time, we match the BSWS and the ETS. The matched worker-…rm cross-section dataset we obtain allows us to establish that there is a negative correlation between the mean of the wage residuals and out ‡ow. Thus, we are able to con…rm the existence of an e¢ ciency wage mechanism on average. Moreover, by using the unknown regime switching regression methodology à la Dickens and Lang (1985), we distinguish between the two sectors and show that only one can be characterized by an e¢ ciency wage according to the same criterion used previously (a negative correlation between the mean of the wage residuals and out ‡ows). Finally, we study the evolution of the share of primary sector through simulation. The fact that the primary sector substantially increased between 1981 and 2005 conforms to the predictions of our model. However, the relative importance of the e¢ ciency wage mechanism to the structural evolution of the industry and …rm size changes over the same period has to be nuanced.
Several important implications can be drawn from this paper. First, we con…rmed that rising wage inequalities can be related to increasing productivity dispersion among Japanese …rms. Second, our focus on labor market mechanisms shows that it is possible to generate a similar trend of rising wage inequalities to that observed in Japan during the Lost Decade, without resorting to hypotheses concerning skill-biased technical change or globalization. Third, the rising share of a primary sector characterized by high wages and tenure is somewhat counterintuitive if one considers the state of the debate on the end of the so-called "Japanese employment system". Thus, we con…rm previous research showing that the reality is in fact more complex than the story usually told (Kato, 2001) .
At the same time, this paper has some limitations that need to be overcome in order to draw stronger conclusions on the role of e¢ ciency wage mechanisms in rising wage inequalities in Japan. From this standpoint, it is possible to consider at least two extensions of this work. First, it would be desirable to study directly the evolution of the inter…rm wage and productivity di¤erentials, rather than indirectly through the share of primary …rms. Second, it would be necessary in the future to precisely decompose the overall wage di¤erential into the within-…rm and between-…rm di¤erentials.
